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The topic addressed by Gärdenfors1 in 
Conceptual Spaces is representation. 
How do high-level concepts, represented 
symbolically (i.e. by language) arise from low-
level neural processes? This book details a 
response based on something new, namely 
a topological approach in which the notion of 
spatial nearness plays the central role.
I first heard Gärdenfors describe this approach 
in a talk at the International Congress 
on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of 
Science in Florence, 1995. Gärdenfors, 
a Swedish professor of philosophy who 
achieved fame for his contributions to logic 
in the area known as belief revision, is a tall, 
elegant fellow and a charismatic speaker. 
Still, I left his talk in Florence feeling as if I had 
dined on candy floss instead of steak – the 
topic was interesting, the approach novel, but 
there was a dearth of nitty-gritty details. Five 
years later, Conceptual Spaces appeared and 
at last we have a feast of details.
In order to place the book in context, two 
opposing lines of thought in cognitive 
science should be mentioned. The symbolic 
tradition views thought as the manipulation 
of language, and has scant respect for 
semantics. Daniel Dennett has been one of 
the most influential advocates of this model, 
for example writing that2 “...brains...can only 
be synta[c]tic engines, responding only to 
structural or formal properties. According 
to the traditional distinction in linguistics, a 
sentence’s form or syntax is one thing and 
its meaning or semantics is another. Now 
how does the brain manage to get semantics 
from syntax? It couldn’t.” In other words, 
Dennett asserts that the only representations 
of information in the brain are symbolic 
representations, and thus that cognition is 
(only) a matter of processing language with 
the help of syntactic rules.
The alternative model has been articulated 
particularly clearly by Stevan Harnad, who 
espouses a three-level theory of representation3 
in terms of which perception involves first 
the construction of iconic representations 
– topographically organised analogs of the 
sensory input – followed by the construction 
of higher-level categorical representations 
by means of some kind of analog-to-discrete 
transformation, culminating finally in symbolic 
representations. Loosely speaking, the model 
says that if you look at a landscape you 
first have a pattern of neural excitation in 
the brain that resembles the picture on the 
retina, with bits that are close together in 
the retinal image corresponding to areas 
of excitation that are close together in the 
brain. This iconic representation undergoes 
a change that exaggerates some differences 
while discarding others, in much the same 
way that an accurate photo of a landscape 
(or person) may be caricatured or reduced to 
a line drawing. This hardening of boundaries 
changes what was originally continuous 
variation into discrete parts that may readily 
be distinguished – here is a tree, there a 
building. The omission of detail required by 
the change makes the result more generic, 
so that it can stand for a whole class of items 
rather than one specific item. And at this 
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point it becomes possible to attach labels 
(symbols) to the representation, which brings 
language into the arena.
The problem with the three-level theory of 
representation has always been the middle 
level. How exactly is the analog-to-discrete 
transformation accomplished? In his book, 
Gärdenfors approaches the middle level 
activity from a geometric perspective. 
However, this is no dry geometry text. 
Gärdenfors’s account draws upon the full 
panoply of cognitive science – psychology, 
philosophy, logic, computer science, and 
linguistics. The lasting impression created 
by the book is of the extraordinary breadth, 
both substantive and methodological, that 
the author has at his command.
So what is a conceptual space?
Crudely speaking, a space is a mathematical 
structure with dimensions along which 
measurements may be noted. But conceptual 
spaces are unlike the spaces used in natural 
sciences like physics, for Gärdenfors sees 
conceptual spaces as human, or at least 
agent-oriented (since one would expect our 
understanding of other animals and even 
our design of artificial agents to benefit 
from the theory). Whereas in physics one 
would measure, for example, the absolute 
wavelengths and frequencies of light, a 
conceptual space concerned with vision would 
be structured according to the way a human 
perceives the light, which is something rather 
different from objective measurements of 
wavelength and frequency. While wavelength 
still plays a role, the dimensions of the 
conceptual space are partly determined by 
the agent architecture, and what is important 
is not whether the wavelength is so many 
nanometers but whether the agent perceives 
it as blue. After all, it is a fact of perception 
that colour constancy requires a term such as 
blue to be associated with various different 
wavelengths depending on the context (i.e. 
depending on the time of day, whether the 
sky is cloudy, and so on).
(To see how different perception and physics 
can be, the reader is invited to visit the 
webpage http://www.scientificpsychic.
com/graphics/shadow.jpg, which illustrates 
how the same shade of grey, i.e. the same 
absolute wavelength of light, may, depending 
only on context, be perceived by a human 
agent either as black or as white.)
One begins the construction of a conceptual 
space, therefore, with quality dimensions 
– such as hue, saturation, and luminosity, if 
we continue to take the perception of colour 
as an example. Such quality dimensions 
correspond to ways in which an agent can 
judge stimuli to be the same or different. 
Gärdenfors gives examples showing that 
researchers who want to model the conceptual 
spaces of agents can identify relevant quality 
dimensions by statistical techniques such as 
multi-dimensional scaling.
Quality dimensions form clusters called 
domains. For example, a stimulus object 
cannot have hue without also having a degree 
of saturation and of luminosity, so those three 
dimensions together form the colour domain. 
Dimensions such as weight or pitch would not 
form part of this domain but would belong to 
their own clusters.
A conceptual space consists of one or 
more domains together with a notion of 
distance (a metric). Non-mathematicians 
tend to be surprised by the suggestion 
that there can be more than one kind of 
distance, but Gärdenfors shows that it is 
necessary to consider various kinds of 
metric. Two examples illustrate how notions 
of distance can differ. The Euclidean metric 
is (roughly speaking) a way of measuring the 
distance between two points in the space 
by taking the length of the straight line 
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connecting those points; whereas the City-
Block metric measures the distance by, as 
it were, following the streets (i.e. going first 
horizontally the necessary number of steps 
and then vertically, instead of cutting straight 
across like the Euclidean metric).
The metric associated with a particular 
conceptual space has a very important role 
to play in the construction of categorical 
representations (the middle level of Harnad’s 
theory of representation). Gärdenfors 
postulates the following role for the metric: 
Given a conceptual space, certain subsets 
of the space are convex regions. Roughly 
speaking, if you have two measurements 
in a convex region then any measurements 
between those two will also fall in the convex 
region. Or visualise a convex region as a fat 
blob, like the inside of a circle or a square 
rather than the inside of a wasp-waisted 
figure eight. Basically, convex regions are nice 
things to have, according to Gärdenfors, who 
suggests that concepts, or properties such as 
“is blue”, correspond to convex regions in the 
relevant conceptual space.
The mechanism proposed for the construction 
of categorical representations is  known as 
a Voronoi tessellation of the space, which 
is a process that breaks the space up into 
convex regions. The metric forms the Voronoi 
tessellation with the aid of prototypes.
Here Gärdenfors links conceptual spaces 
with a well-established area in cognitive 
psychology. A prototype may be thought of 
as a cognitive reference point. Consider the 
colour categories again. It is known that 
humans, regardless of ethnicity or culture, 
agree on certain areas of colour space as the 
best examples of basic colour terms in their 
language.4 That is to say, there are certain 
small bits of colour space that everyone 
would agree best exemplify red, green, blue, 
and so on. (And this is not a theoretical 
assumption but a thoroughly tested empirical 
fact, not only for colour categories but for a 
variety of other ‘basic’ categories5.)
Let us, following Eleanor Rosch, call these 
points the prototypes of the colour categories. 
And let us suppose that we have a conceptual 
space in which certain points, the prototypes, 
have been identified. Now the metric 
associated with the space can be used to 
annex to each prototype all the points in the 
space that lie closer to it than to any other 
prototype. The result is a Voronoi tessellation, 
a breaking up of the (continuous) space into 
a discrete collection of convex regions. At 
last we have a mechanism to accomplish the 
analog-to-discrete transformation required by 
Harnad’s middle level of representation.
Mindful of his roots as logician, Gärdenfors 
proceeds to link conceptual spaces with 
Jackendoff’s views on semantics6 and 
with intensional logic. He draws a new 
philosophical distinction between properties 
and concepts. He shows that conceptual 
spaces provide a rich framework unifying 
various discussions pertaining to artificial 
intelligence and theory of mind. But for 
me the key achievement is to cast light on 
the previously problematic middle level 
of representation, and thereby to deal a 
stunning blow to those who, like Dennett, 
attempt to construe cognition in terms of 
syntax only, without internally represented 
symbol-grounding semantics.
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